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MURR AND WISCONSIN: THE BADGER 
????????????? ??????LATORY TAKINGS 
Property rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property ownership 
empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where 
governments are always eager to do so for them.
— Justice Anthony Kennedy1
Ronald Reagan said, ‘Freedom is never more than one generation away from 
extinction . . . . It must be fought for, protected, and handed on [to our children] 
to do the same . . . .’  So it is with property rights.  They must always be fought 
for, through good times and bad.  Even with victory, defenders of this core 
liberty can never rest.
— John M. Groen2
I.INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 262?
II.TAKINGS CLAUSE SUMMARY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF REGULATORY 
TAKINGS ............................................................................................. 264?
A.? Early English Roots and Pre-Takings Clause Colonial Practice 264?
B.? The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause ................... 266?
C.? Early Judicial Interpretation and the Incorporation of the Takings 
Clause ......................................................................................... 268?
D.? The Regulatory Takings Revolution: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon ......................................................................................... 271?
III.THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE PRIOR TO MURR ....................... 273?
A.? Penn Central Analysis ................................................................ 274?
B.? Denominator of the Fraction ....................................................... 278?
IV.THE MURR PROBLEM ............................................................................... 279?
A. Wisconsin Courts and Regulatory Takings ................................... 280?
B. Murr???????????????????????? .................................................... 282?
C. Factual and Procedural Background.............................................. 284?
V. MURR AT THE SUPREME COURT ............................................................... 287?
A. The Arguments of the Murr Family and the State of Wisconsin .. 287?
1. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017). 
2. John Groen, Supreme Court Setback Spurs New Drive to Defend Property Rights Nationwide,
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/10/03/supreme-court-setback-
spurs-new-drive-to-defend-property-rights-nationwide/2/#696c98364d42 [https://perma.cc/SE9H-
8HWL]. 
262 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:261 
B. Murr v. Wisconsin: The Decision .................................................. 288?
VI. RESPONSE TO THE DECISION ................................................................... 293?
A. Academic Reaction to the Decision .............................................. 293?
B. Wisconsin Law in the Wake of Murr ............................................ 295?
??? ??????????????????????????????????? ................................. 295?
2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court and the New Murr Standard . 297?
a.? New Federalism: Independent Interpretation of the Takings 
Clause Under the Wisconsin Constitution ...................... 298?
b.? Narrow Interpretation and Application of Murr??? ????-
Factor Test ...................................................................... 302?
VII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 306?
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 27, 2017, the Wisconsin Legislature significantly weakened 
state and local regulations along the pristine St. Croix River.3  While Wisconsin 
has prioritized deregulation over the past decade,4 there was something 
????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????
Bill of Rights, formally titled Act 67,5 was a swift legislative response to Murr 
v. Wisconsin.6  In Murr, the United States Supreme Court upheld pervasive 
governmental ????????????????????????????????????????????????? to freely use or 
dispose of its waterside property along the St. Croix River.7  The Wisconsin 
Homeowner?? Bill of Rights restored these property rights by pulling back on 
3. See H. Sterling Burnett, Wisconsin Legislature Passes “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights”, THE 
HEARTLAND INST. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/wisconsin-
legislature-passes-homeowners-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/SE9H-8HWL]. 
4. See, e.g., Mary Spicuzza, Telecom Deregulation Bill gets State Legislature’s OK, WIS. STATE 
JOURNAL (May 12, 2011), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/telecom-
deregulation-bill-gets-state-legislature-s-ok/article_f4ceb314-7bf8-11e0-8887-001cc4c03286.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FC5-UBB6]; Steven Verburg, Wisconsin Republicans Launch New Rollback of Air, 
Water Protections, WIS. STATE JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2017), 
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/wisconsin-republicans-launch-new-
rollback-of-air-water-protections/article_81101a90-56a2-5841-aa7a-aef12037c77c.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y5V7-BYQB]; Laurel White, Wisconsin Assembly Approves Deregulation of Rent-
To-Own- Companies, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-assembly-
approves-deregulation-rent-own-companies [https://perma.cc/QHQ7-YSMV]. 
5. 2017 Wis. Act 67. 
6. 137 S. Ct. 1933. 
7. Id. at 1950. 
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key statewide land use regulations, bringing substantial ?????????? ???????????
regulatory framework related to land use.8
From a broader jurisprudential perspective, Murr is simply another in a long 
line of cases that fails to clarify the regulatory takings doctrine.9  Indeed, the 
majority in Murr doubles down on an already incoherent doctrine, doubtless
thrusting lower courts around the nation into further confusion on the issue.10
Nonetheless, state governments can minimize the damage of this complex, 
factor-??????? ?????????? ?????? ????????????? ??? ?????????????????????? ????? ????
actively working to preserve individual property rights, and state courts by 
either (1) independently analyzing the Takings Clause pursuant to parallel 
provisions of their own state constitutions or (2) narrowly construing Murr???
multi-factor test.11
This comment examines the current state of the regulatory takings doctrine 
at both the federal and sta??? ???????????????? ????????????????????????????????
Murr v. Wisconsin, and discusses the need to set up structural protections to 
preserve the rights of private property owners.  Specifically, Part II discusses 
the fascinating origins and background of the Takings Clause and the regulatory 
takings doctrine.  Part III examines the regulatory takings doctrine as it was 
structured when the Supreme Court decided Murr.  Part IV provides 
background analysis of the regulatory framework and Wisconsin regulatory 
takings law that undergirds Murr.  Part V describes the Murr??? factual 
???????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ???? ????????
???????? ????????? ? ????? ??? ????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ????? ?????????
decision, evaluates ??????????? ???????????? ?ill of Rights, and provides 
direction for Wisconsin courts in their handling of the post-Murr regulatory 
takings doctrine.  Part VII concludes with a brief overview and presents two 
important takeaways from Murr.
8. 2017 Wis. Act 67; see also ANNA HENNING & SCOTT GROSZ, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL ACT MEMO: 2017 WISCONSIN ACT 67 1?4 (Dec. 1, 2017), 
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/lcactmemo/act067 [https://perma.cc/5TR7-XPWA].  
This legislation has garnered harsh criticism from some. See, e.g., Greg Seitz, Wisconsin Legislature 
Weakens St. Croix River Scenic Protections, ST. CROIX 360 (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.stcroix360.com/2017/11/wisconsin-legislature-weakens-st-croix-river-scenic-
protections/ [https://perma.cc/3B6P-ZC8A]; Greg Seitz, 50th Anniversary: December Dates Mark 
Milestones in St. Croix River Conservation, ST. CROIX 360 (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.stcroix360.com/2017/11/50th-anniversary-december-dates-mark-milestones-in-st-croix-
river-conservation/ [https://perma.cc/4KHD-XSC7]. 
9. See discussion infra Part III. 
10. See discussion infra Section VI.A. 
11. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII. 
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II. TAKINGS CLAUSE SUMMARY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF REGULATORY 
TAKINGS
A. Early English Roots and Pre-Takings Clause Colonial Practice 
The origins of the Takings Clause can be traced to Article 39 of Magna 
Carta,12 ??????????????????????????????????????????? . . stripped of his rights or 
possessions . . . except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the 
??????13  Article 39 created procedural limitations ????????? ??????????
infringements of personal liberty and rights of property.?14  But these 
protections were limited to the physical appropriation of property and failed to 
place any limitations on governmental regulation of private property.15  Indeed, 
governmental land use regulations ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????????????
were left unrestricted.16  Additionally, there was generally no compensation 
requirement even for the physical appropriation of property; Article 39 and 
subsequent common-law protections only provided property owners the right 
to due process.17
Around the time of the founding of the American colonies, the works of Sir 
Edward Coke helped revitalize an emphasis on personal rights, liberties, and 
12. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 56 (1973). 
13. MAGNA CARTA ART. 39, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-
translation [https://perma.cc/B2J4-8KN3].  Magna Carta is a great place to start this analysis of the 
??????????????????????????????generally regarded as one of the great common-law documents and as 
the foundation of constitutional liberties.?Magna Carta, BLACK?S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
14. W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: VOLUME II  215 (3d ed. 1923) (noting 
the importance of this provision considering the fact that arbitrary infringement on property rights was 
one of the chief grievances against the King of England at the time); see also BOSSELMAN ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 57. 
15. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 60?75.  In fact, the government widely utilized 
land use regulations such as lot-size minimum requirements and construction guidelines and 
limitations. Id. at 62, 66; see also DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 18 
(2002). 
16. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra ????? ???? ??? ???? ? ??????????? ???? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????
government regulated private land use for a legitimate government purpose. Id.
17. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785?86 (1995).  The predominant early colonial legal 
structure left the determination of compensation to the political processes; compensation was not a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See id. at 785?86.  Yet, 
government seizure of private property?limited for many years only to improved or enclosed 
property?generally did result in compensation. See id. at 787; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra
note 12, at 85; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 16?18.  Additionally, there was a generally 
accepted emergency exception for the compensation of developed lands. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra
note 12, at 86. 
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due process of law.18 ???????? ?????? ???s and, more generally, the Common 
Law?????????????????????????????19 the right to due process in relation to personal 
property became one of the defining rights in the New World.20  Consequently, 
many colonial laws and early drafts of state constitutions demanded 
compensation for actual physical appropriations?even where those 
appropriations were for the public?? benefit.21
Despite this focus on personal property rights, ???????????????????????????
to regulate land use remained unquestioned.22  Indeed, early governments 
extensively regulated land use and ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ??????tution 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????23
???????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??????? ???????????? ????? ????? ??? ??
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ever-present limitation on property rights.24  In sum, property right protections 
through this era were limited to procedural defenses???????? ???????????
?????????????? ????????????25
18. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 77.   
19. Id. at 80.  See generally ROSCOE POUND, HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW
(1939); W. Hamilton Bryson, English Common Law in Virginia, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 249 (1985); Louis 
E. Zuckermann, The Common Law of America, 53 AM. L. REV. 577 (1919). 
20. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 82. 
21. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 785?86.  One early ???????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????????
??????????????????????????????????although never fully implemented?called for compensation for 
seized property. See id.; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 93 (an early Massachusetts 
colonial law required compensa????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ???????????? ? ??????????????s original state 
constitution was the first ratified with a compensation clause. See id. at 95; Treanor, supra note 17, at 
790?????? ???????????????????????its state constitution called for compensation for government takings. 
See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 94; Treanor, supra note 17, at 790; THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 374 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).  
Additionally, the Northwest Ordinance required compensation for the taking of property. See Treanor,
supra note 17, at 791; THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS, supra, at 374.  The colonies often still allowed for either uncompensated or non-value-based 
compensation where takings were for governmental use. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 787?88. 
22. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 785.  Even Sir Edward Coke ????????????????????????????
authority to regulate private property to the point of depriving the land of all productive use. 
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 80?81. 
23. Treanor, supra note 17, at 785, 787?89.  Local governments during the colonial and early 
statehood period freely regulated business operations and personal and economic decisions related to 
personal property. Id. at 787?89. 
24. Id. at 785. 
25. Id. at 789.  Though real or personal property was protected by colonial charters, these 
protections were largely procedural rather than substantive in nature. Id. at 786. 
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B. The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
The inclusion of property protections in the Bill of Rights is unsurprising 
considering the central status of personal property rights in the colonies.  The 
Takings Clause?the last clause of the Fifth Amendment????????? ????? ??????
private property be taken for public use, without just ??????????????26
Considering the text alone, there is no indication that the Takings Clause was 
intended to provide protection for anything less than actual direct physical 
appropriations.27  However, speculation regarding its origins, intent, and even 
why this specific provision ended up in the Constitution, have muddied the 
waters and made this provision particularly difficult to parse.28
One difficulty when analyzing the Takings Clause is the lack of founding 
era debate surrounding its implementation.29  The Clause was introduced, 
amended, and adopted without significant discussion regarding its content.30
One plausible theory as to why there was no debate surrounding the Takings 
Clause seems to be that the Founders were quite content with what it appeared 
t???????????????????????????????????????????????????????procedural protection 
from, and compensation for, only direct physical appropriations.31  Thus, 
though still open to debate, many scholars believe there was no objection to the 
creation and adoption of the Takings Clause because it only appeared to 
prohibit direct physical appropriations, not the ???????????? widely accepted 
authority to regulate property rights.32
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
27. See Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies 
Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 256 (2015). 
28. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 9, 13?16, 20; David A. Thomas, Finding More 
Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
497, 519?20 (2004). 
29. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 791; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 11, 25; Matthew P. 
Harrington, Regulatory Takings and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2053, 2078 (2004). 
30. See generally COGAN, supra note 21, at 361?72. 
31. Treanor, supra note 17, at 785. 
32. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2053, 2063.  Indeed, many attending the Philadelphia 
Convention supported governmental regulation of economic and property rights. See id.; see also 
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that there is no affirmative evidence supporting this 
assertion, but rather just an uncontradicted body of evidence); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 
104; J. Peter Byrne, A Hobbesian Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property Rights Legacy of Justice 
Scalia, 41 VT. L. REV. 733, 735 (2017); Treanor, supra note 17, at 785.  But see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, 
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1553?55 (2003) (arguing that 
those in the founding era did intend to protect against regulatory intrusions); Kris W. Kobach, The 
Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1212 (1996)
(noting that regulatory takings law was introduced prior to Mahon). 
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This position is further supported by the writings of two key figures whose 
work undoubtedly influenced the content of the Takings Clause: Sir William 
Blackstone33 and James Madison.34  Blackstone?a champion for individual 
liberties and property rights?believed that personal property rights were 
fundamental, stating, ?[s]o great moreover is the regard of the law for private 
property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the 
???????? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????????35  But like Sir Edward Coke, 
??????????? ??????????? ????? ????? ???s?????? ??????? ???? nonetheless subject to 
??????????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??????? thereby indicating that governmental 
regulation should not be restricted.36  Many Founding Fathers echoed 
?????????????????????????????????????37  In particular, James Madison?the man 
who seemingly sua sponte introduced the Takings Clause38?believed that the 
??????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ???? ?????????????? ???
property . . . provid[ing] that none shall be taken directly even for public use 
???????? ???????????????? ??? ???????????39  The Founders, then, seem to have 
largely understood that the Takings Clause reached only direct physical 
appropriations and not governmental regulations.??
33. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 90?91 (noting that the work of Blackstone 
profoundly influenced the Founders as they constructed the Constitution). 
34. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 784. 
35. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134?35, 140?41 (1st 
ed. 1765).  Blackstone did note, however, that such action could be justified where the owner is given 
?????????????????????????????????????????Id.
36.  Id. at 134 (?????????????solute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which 
consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or 
diminution, save only by the laws of the land??) (emphasis added). 
37. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787: VOLUME I (Max Farrand ed., 
1937??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????Id. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????Id. at 302.  Morris stated, ???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id.
at 536 (emphasis omitted).  Early Supreme Court precedent further supports these views. Vanhor?????
?????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????????[t]he Constitution expressly declares, that the 
right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property is natural, ??????????????????????????????
38. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 10, 13; Treanor, supra note 17, at 834. 
39. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (Mar. 29, 1792), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.html [https://perma.cc/LJ5D-B6Z7]. (emphasis 
added); see also Treanor, supra note 17, at 838 (?Property was one of the series of essays that Madison 
published in the National Gazette ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . . ????
40. But this view was not unanimously held. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787: VOLUME II (Max Farrand ed., 1937).  For example, John F. Mercer criticized 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 284.  For a thorough analysis of the 
original understanding of the Takings Clause, see generally Treanor, supra note 17. 
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The work of St. George Tucker, a historian and contemporary of the 
?????????????????????????also indicates that the Takings Clause was meant to be 
limited in application to physical appropriations: 
That part of the [Fifth Amendment] which declares that private 
property shall not be taken for public use, without just 
compensation, was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary 
and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and 
other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently 
practi[c]ed during the revolutionary war, without any 
compensation whatever.41
??????????????????view, the Takings Clause only mandated compensation for 
physical seizure of property, an issue that was common throughout the 
Revolutionary War.42
Viewed together, the limited text of the Takings Clause, the lack of 
recorded debate on the issue, and the then-predominant view of governmental 
regulations suggests that the Founders intended the Takings Clause to merely 
provide procedural protections, requiring compensation only for the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????43
C. Early Judicial Interpretation and the Incorporation of the Takings 
Clause
Through the dawn of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court had little 
opportunity to develop its own Takings Clause analysis due to the limited 
power of the federal government and the fact that the Fifth Amendment was not 
41. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, NOTES OF REFERENCE 305?06 (electronic ed. 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
42. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 791?92; see also Harrington, supra note 29, at 2073?74 
(noting the prevalence of such involuntary impressment of property throughout the revolutionary war); 
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 11?12. But see Thomas, supra note 28, at 545. 
43. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2078 (noting that Madison only intended to deal with direct 
and not regulatory takings issues); see also Treanor, supra note 17, at 838?39.  S????? ????????????
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), ??? ??? ?????? ????? ??????????????
?????????? ????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????????????? ??? ???? ????????? RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985); see also
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1057????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????? ??????? ??????????? ???? ???? extend to regulations of property, whatever the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
part of our ??????????????????????????Id. at 1028.  While the Court addressed the original understanding 
of the Takings Clause in Lucas, that discussion only showed that the Court has lost its way on the issue 
of regulatory takings and the original understanding of the clause no longer has any bearing on modern 
regulatory takings law. Id. at 1055?60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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yet applicable to the action of state governments.44  Nonetheless, those early 
state and Supreme Court opinions that did analyze the Takings Clause restricted 
its scope to the direct physical appropriation of property?seemingly consistent 
with the original understanding of the clause.45
In the Legal Tender Cases,46 the Supreme Court discussed the basis for this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????always 
been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to the 
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.  It has never
been supposed to . . . inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to 
?????????????47  Generally limiting compensation to physical invasions,48 the 
Court allowed regulatory limitations?even those stripping the property of all 
or nearly all value?so long as those regulations were within the non-arbitrary 
execution of the extraordinarily broad police power.49  Indeed, during this time, 
any argument for compensation resulting from action short of direct a physical 
appropriation was hardly rational in th??????????????.50   
The exception to this narrow line of interpretation is Pumpelly v. Green Bay 
Co.,51 a case in which the Supreme Court for the first time applied the Takings 
Clause to governmental action short of taking title.52  Specifically, the Court in 
Pumpelly held that the continuous flooding of property by a government dam 
was an unconstitutional taking that required compensation.53  Analyzing the 
44. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250???? ??????? ??????????????????????]
contain[s] no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments.  This Court 
?????????????????????????see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (2018); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 114?
15; Treanor, supra note 17, at 794 n.69.  State courts, on the other hand, dealt with the takings issue a 
fair amount through their own state constitutions. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106?14. 
45. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 792, 795; Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 53 (2017).  But see Thomas, supra note 28, at 532?33 (arguing that 
compensation for takings consistently extended not only to land that was actually physically taken). 
46. 79 U.S. 457 (1870). 
47. Id. at 551 (emphasis added); see also Treanor, supra note 17, at 796. 
48. Also known as the power of eminent domain. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 4. 
49. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667?70 (1887) (holding that private property 
could be regulated pursuant to the police power without compensation, regardless of the impact on the 
property?? value); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 4; BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, 
at 117?20. 
50. Legal Tender Cases?? ???????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????? ???????
theory). 
51. 80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
52. Treanor, supra note 17, at 795 n.74 (noting that Pumpelly ???????????????????????????????????
strict interpretation). 
53. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181. 
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takings issue, the Court stated that an absolute physical taking is not required 
for there to be a compensable taking ?????? ???????? ????????? ??? ??????????
invaded . . . or . . . [has] any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually 
destroy or impair [the] ????????????????????????????54
Straying little from the strict rule of the Legal Tender Cases,55 Pumpelly is 
nonetheless quite significant because of its previously unrecognized rationale.56
While promptly limited in scope and application,57 Pumpelly revealed a 
changing perception of the Takings Clause.  Through its deference to 
circumstantial equity, the Court showed its willingness to broaden the 
application of the Takings Clause?a willingness fully realized roughly fifty 
years later in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.58
54. Id.
55. Treanor, supra note 17, at 796 n.74 (noting that Pumpelly still required sustained actual or 
consequential physical interference with the property??????? ??????????????? ????????to trigger the 
compensation requirement). 
56. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177??????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????sis?
finding a taking in something less than an actual physical appropriation?????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id.
57. See, e.g., Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (noting that Pumpelly was 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not ????????????????????????????????????????????; see 
also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 117????????????????????????????????????????????Mugler
expressly limited the holding in Pumpelly). 
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  It is also important to note that the incorporation of the Takings Clause 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????Mahon.  Indeed, the incorporation of the Takings Clause 
in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896), was a major breakthrough for 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493 (1977).  In the regulatory takings context, 
application of the Takings Clause to state action through incorporation pushed more state regulatory 
issues to the fore of the takings analysis, forcing the courts to address issues such as that presented in 
Mahon. E.g., Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412 (analyzing a state law issue on review from a state supreme 
court). 
 As a side, it is also interesting to note that there is some disagreement regarding whether Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago formally incorporated the Takings Clause. See Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 141 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1978) (stating 
summarily that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago incorporated the Takings Clause); 
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 18 (noting that the Takings Clause was incorporated through Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago). C.f., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: 
Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 829?30, 875?
93 (2006) (noting that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago case failed to even 
mention the Fifth Amendment or the Takings Clause and was decided solely on Fourteenth 
Amendment due process terms). 
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D. The Regulatory Takings Revolution: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
????????????????????generally narrow construction of the Takings Clause 
continued until the revolution that was ???????? ???????s opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon59??perhaps the single most important 
????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????????60  Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the 
jurisprudential significance of this shift away from the limited and generally 
accepted understanding of the Takings Clause.61
Mahon began as a suit over the statutory diminution of property value and 
contract rights for a coal mining company conducting operations in and around 
Scranton, Pennsylvania.62  The statute at issue, the Kohler Act, prohibited coal 
mining that threatened certain surrounding structures by placing substantial 
regulatory restrictions on the pre-existing rights of mining companies.63  Rather 
than adhere to the predictable baseline established by the Legal Tender Cases,
Justice Holmes trained ??????????? analysis on the extent to which such purely 
regulatory restrictions are justified.64  The Supreme Court thus admitted?for 
the first time in its Takings Clause jurisprudence?that there are limits to the 
?????????????????????????????????????65
Unfortunately, the Court provided no clear test for the determination of 
????? ?? ??????????? ??? ??? ????? ?? ???????????? ??? ??? ???????? ?????????????66
Instead, Justice Holmes applied a subjective, fact-intensive inquiry that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????67  Out 
of this pliable balancing test focused on the ill-?????????????????????????????68
59. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
60. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12. 
61. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2055.  Chief Justice William Rehnquist called Mahon ?????
??????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ????????? ???????????????? ????????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ???
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), and the Court rightly stated that 
???????????????s ???????? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? ?????????????.??Tahoe?Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v?????????????????????????????, 535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002). 
62. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412, 414. 
63. Id. at 412, 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
64. Id. ??? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ????????????? . . . ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????
resulting from the regulation.).  Justice Holmes believed that, if the Takings Clause were to be limited 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 415. 
65. Id. at 413. Interestingly, Mahon was perhaps the culmination of a career in which Holmes 
sought a limitation on the police power. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 798?99. 
66. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
67. Id. at 413?16. 
68. Id. at 416; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
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????????????????????????????????????69 ???????while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.?70
Thus, in one fell swoop, Justice Holmes and the Court unceremoniously 
disposed of decades of Supreme Court precedent by holding that purely 
regulatory actions were within the purview of the Takings Clause.71  Holmes 
reasoned that this approach was justified because even ????????????????????????
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????72
Mahon signaled two significant changes in the Takings Clause doctrine.  
First, it recognized that purely regulatory governmental action may rise to the 
level of an unconstitutional taking that requires just compensation.73  Second, 
???????s ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????74
has left the Court without clear direction for nearly a century.75  Yet today, the 
???????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ?????? and provide a cogent 
framework is an unfortunate characteristic of the regulatory takings doctrine.76
69. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). 
70. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). 
71. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2055.  In dissent, Justice Brandeis put up a commendable 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????????????
deprives the owner of the only ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????Mahon, 260 U.S.
at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Justice Brandeis also argued that the state is not required to resort to 
eminent domain for regulatory takings. Id. at 418.  Additionally, Justice Brandeis shrewdly identified 
????????????????????????????????????s opinion, including the difficulties of determining the base value 
of the property to be considered under this new regulatory takings doctrine?an issue that would come 
to be known as the denominator factor. Id. at 419. 
72. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.  
73. Property rights proponents argue that this development positively changed conceptions about 
property rights and private use. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 811?12. 
74. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (2005). 
75. Treanor, supra note 17, at 782; see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) 
(??esolution of each case . . . ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application 
of logic.????Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto?????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
occasions, this Court has generally been unable to develop any set formula for determining when 
justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action must be deemed a 
com???????????????????????????????????????marks omitted). 
76. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 782; see also Shelby D. Green, One Parcel Plus One Parcel 
Equals a “Parcel as a Whole”: ???????? ?????????? Fluid Calculations for Regulatory Takings, PROB.
& PROP., ?????????????????? 10 (2018).  Wisconsin courts have also expressed their frustration with the 
lack of clear standards. See Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. Ostrom, 335 N.W.2d 596, 602 (1983) ??The 
problem of how to distinguish between an unconstitutional taking and a police power regulation is a 
difficult one, and the decisions of the Supreme Court have not made it less difficult.??.
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III. THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE PRIOR TO MURR
Although consistently applied in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,77
Mahon was not significantly extended or developed until Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,78 a case which sparked rapid, often 
unpredictable changes to the regulatory takings doctrine.  This section attempts 
to make sense of the confusing muddle79 of regulatory takings law as it stood 
when the Supreme Court took up Murr?particularly those aspects relevant to 
the Supreme ???????????????? in Murr.
The oft-repeated, judicially created ?????????????????????????????? . . . is 
to prevent the government from ?forcing some people alone to bear the public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.??80  To these ends, case law indicates that courts conducting a regulatory 
???????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ????
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly 
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.?81  With this 
unsatisfyingly amorphous basis in mind, regulatory takings cases can generally 
be placed in one of four categories: (1) the regulatory taking that is also 
??????????????????? ??????????? ??? ??????, ???? ??? Lucas-type total regulatory 
????????????????Penn Central ?????????????????a land-use exaction violating the?
Nollan–Dolan standards.82  This section provides the relevant considerations 
and analysis for the first three.83
77. See, e.g., Delaware, Lackawanna, & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193 
(1928) (citing Mahon favorably in the context of takings and the police power); United States v. Cent. 
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (noting that the test for takings claims is circumstantial 
pursuant to Mahon); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (observing that 
governmental regulation can ?be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires 
???????????????
78. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Blais, supra note 45, at 54. 
79. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 2016-2017, at 131, 133 (2017).  Regulatory takings law has, perhaps, best been characterized as 
????????????????? ???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ????????????
Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 307, 328 (2007); see also
Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for 
Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 54?55 (2017). 
80. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617?18 (2001) (quoting Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
81. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Robert 
Meltz, Substantive Takings Law: A Primer 18 (Oct. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
82. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83. ???? ??????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? Horne v. Dep’t of 
Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2?????????????????????????????????????????????????????Murr and is therefore 
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The first two categories are distinct because a regulatory action falling 
????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
??????????84 ??????? ???????????? ????? ??????? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??
permanent physical invasion of her property???????????????? ??????? ?????
compensation.85  Second, compensation is required where the regulation denies 
?all economically productive or beneficial uses ??? ??????86  The precise 
??????????? ?????????????? ??? ????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ?????????? ?????????
remain unclear and any analysis typically requires substantial factual 
background to determine whether all beneficial use of the relevant parcel has 
been denied by the regulation.87
A. Penn Central Analysis 
The third and most conceptually problematic category?still largely 
????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? Penn Central88?asks whether a 
government regulation goes too far, resulting in a compensable taking.89  The 
difficulties here spring from the noted absence in Penn Central of ???? ?????
????????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? and the admitted ?????????????? ???????????? ???
outside the purview of this comment.  For further analysis of this category, see Meltz, supra note 79, 
at 366?70. 
84. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.  
85. Id.  (emphasis added).  Just compensation is required for permanent physical appropriations 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????? it
chops through the bundle?????????????????????????????????????????? v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (emphasis added). 
86. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (emphasis added).  As clarified 
by Tahoe–Sierra?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Penn Central ????????? fact intensive analysis. Tahoe?Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. ???????????????
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326, 330 (2002) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019?20 n.8); see also
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Blais, supra note 45, at 59, 62?65; Meltz, supra note 79, at 331?32.  There is 
a significant exception to this rule where the regulations simply supplement background principles 
already in place when the property owner acquired the land. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 329, 352?54.
Additionally, temporary moratoriums on property use do not necessarily result in a taking because time 
is only one factor when considering whether there has been a total taking. See Tahoe?Sierra, 535 U.S. 
at 321; see also Meltz, supra note 79, at 331 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1018???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 18); see also Tahoe–Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
87. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030??????????????????????????????????????????s???????????????????
courts must be able to identify the relevant parcel?the denominator of the fraction?a difficult task in 
its own right. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
88. It is, of course, frustrating that the Supreme Court continues to rely on a forty-year-old 
???????????????? ?????????ad hocery???? ??????supra note 81 (manuscript at 21) (emphasis added). 
89. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
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determining what constitutes a taking.90  But, in an effort to provide some 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
principal guideli?????????????????????????????????????????????91  These factors?
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????92?require a 
????????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ???? ????????? ???????????????93
Unfortunately, as the following discussion demonstrates, these standards are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????determining 
when a regulation results in an unconstitutional taking.94
The Penn Central ??????????????????????????????95 upon the first factor: the 
?????????? ??????? ??? ???? ????????????96 ??????????? ????? ???????? ???????s
analysis in Mahon, courts must consider the degree of loss to determine whether 
a taking has occurred.97 ?? ?????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ???????even 
depriving a parcel of its most profitable use?is not enough to work a taking.98
Rather, courts must determine ???????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????99
The second Penn Central factor considers whether the regulation has 
deprived the property ?????? ??? ??????????? ???????????-backed 
??????????????100  While the Court in Penn Central unsurprisingly failed to 
specify exactly what this means?or even whose investment-backed 
expectations were to be considered?it did focus the analysis on the original 
cost basis of the property right rather than the fair market value of the property 
90. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123?24 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538?39. 
91. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538?39. 
92. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
93. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6??????????????????????????????????????????
94. Meltz, supra note 81; Meltz, supra note 79, at 329?30, 333.  The indeterminacy of these 
standards may be why the Court has never found a taking where this framework has been applied. See
Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 20). 
95. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. 
96. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
97. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 334; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
98. Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 21); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131; Concrete Pipe 
& Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). 
99. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 334; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.  The first factor also requires that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Mahon,
260 U.S. at ??????????????????????????????????????, to some extent, values incident to property could 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
100. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
276 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:261 
right at stake at the time of the alleged taking.101 ??????????-of-????????????????
?????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????102 and (2) consistent with the conditions under 
which the expectations were developed.103  Furthermore, it has been recognized 
that no taking occurs simply because the governmental ??????????? ?????? ???
economically beneficial circumstance that [the property owner] would like to 
???????????????????????? ????????????????-backed expe????????? ???????????
that benefit.104  The second Penn Central factor thus encompasses a host of 
considerations for determining the reasonableness of a property ????????
expectations.105
The third Penn Central factor ??????????????????????????????????????????
act?????106  This?the most flexible and least important Penn Central
factor107????????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ????????:
?prevent[ing] the government from ?forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.??108  Under this factor, ?????????????????????? ????????????????????? as 
??????? ????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ??? ??? ????? ??
???????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ??????????? ????????ated it or 
?????????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????????109  Additional principles indicate that 
101. See Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to 
Clean up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 151, 169 (2017); Meltz, supra
note 81 (manuscript at 25) (????? ??????????????? ??? ????????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ???Penn 
Central ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????).
102. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005?06 (1984) ????????? ???????????????
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). 
103. Id. at 1007.  Thus, to the extent buyers are or should be aware that their holdings are subject 
to regulation, their reasonable expectations cannot be contrary to those background principles. Meltz, 
supra note 79, at 340.  In this way, the expectations must be (1) actual and (2) objectively reasonable. 
Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 24). 
104. Meltz, supra note 79, at 317 (emphasis omitted). 
105. Timing considerations also play a role in the development of reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.  Although the taking of title post-regulation does not per se deprive the new owner of the 
right to assert a claim, see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001), such timing will make 
the demonstration of reasonable investment-backed expectations exceedingly difficult, see Meltz, 
supra note 79, at 323?24. 
106. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
107. Meltz, supra note 79, at 341?42. 
108. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617?18 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
109. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. ?????????????????????, 560 U.S. 702, 713, 715 
(2010); see also ?????????????????????acies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (????????????
by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . .?). 
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governmental action must have a direct adverse impact on the property to 
constitute a taking,110 and takings need not be permanent to be compensable.111
This third Penn Central factor is particularly difficult because it requires 
courts to balance public interest against the burden of the regulation upon the 
private property owner.112  Justice Holmes focused on this balancing in Mahon,
framing regulatory takings as an express limitation on the otherwise legitimate 
police power.113  But the practical working out of this limitation is quite 
difficult.  In Lingle???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
impermissible . . ?? ???????? ??????????? ?????????????114  Nevertheless, the Court 
??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????by 
definition????????????????????????????????????????????????????????115  In short, 
?????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????? ??????????????? ??????????? ??? ?????
analysis remains unclear, recognizing and understanding the weight of the 
police power interests at play is important for a thorough takings analysis.116
110. Meltz, supra note 79, at 321. 
111. See Ark. ?????????????????????????????????????, 568 U.S. 23 (2012); see also id. at 38 
(????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable 
????????).  
112. See Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 27); see also Thomas, supra note 28, at 546 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????and concluding that the police power is traditionally 
limited to nuisance suppression and does not ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
113. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (????????????????????????????????????
power [has ???????????????????????????).  With this focus, Mahon should perhaps have been read as a 
due process case rather than a Takings Clause case. See Karkkainen, supra note 58, at 862?65, 870, 
874.  The balancing against the police power approach reached its peak in Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980), where the Court required an analysis of whether the applicable regulation 
????????????????????????? legitimate state interests?? Id. at 260; see also Meltz, supra note 79, at 356.  
This test, however, proved too involved and the Court pared it back in Lingle, stating that the police 
power analysis is derived from due process principles rather than a Takings Clause analysis. Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005); see also Meltz, supra note 79, at 313.  The overlap 
between these two theories still exists and presents an interesting question: What role should the police 
power hold in the regulatory takings analysis? Id. at 314. 
114. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
115. Id. at 538. 
116. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 324?27; Thomas, supra ????? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ?????
modern U.S. Supreme Court has not been clear or consistent about what it believes is the operating 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????cus solely on the 
Armstrong principles: considering whether there is an arbitrary singling out of individuals or discrete 
and insular classes of property owners for harsher treatment than the rest?whether to benefit other 
identifiable individuals or classes or to benefit the public generally. See Karkkainen, supra note 58, at 
912.  Another theory is that, as the police power was originally understood as limited to dealing with 
nuisance abatement, any governmental regulation on property that extends beyond this traditional 
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B. Denominator of the Fraction 
Perhaps the most critical consideration in evaluating whether a regulation 
works a total taking or goes too far is the determination of what makes up the 
???????? ??? ?? ??????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ??????????the base against 
which the economic impact of the regulation is weighed.117  This often 
outcome-determinative issue118?the central issue in Murr and applicable to 
three of the four categories of regulatory takings119?is rooted in Penn Central???
statement that courts must consider the p???????????????????????????????????e a 
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????120  The Court elaborated on 
????? ?????-?????????????? ?????????? ?? Andrus v. Allard?? ?where an owner 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????of 
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its 
boundary requires compensation. Thomas, supra note 28, at 546.  Regardless of the precise analysis, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over-expansive use of what is often l??????????????????????????????Id. at 500. 
117. ??????????????????????????????????????????????, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).  The Court 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 631 (2001); see also Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 223, 253 
(2017). 
118. See Daniel L. Siegel, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine 
Help to Define the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. ????? ???? ???????? ? ???????? ????? ????????
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????supra note 79, at 347. 
119. The exception is the Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., physical invasion 
principle. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, ???????????????????????????????????????
invasion . . . ?????????????????quires just compensation); see also ????????????????????????, 135 S. 
Ct. 2419, 2429 (2015). 
120. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130?31 (1978).  This statement 
and the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????s formulation in Mahon which concluded that there was a regulatory taking where 
???????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????? ???? ??????????????? supra
note 101, at 164. 
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??????????121  While generally supporting this anti-segmentation principle,122 the 
Court has nonetheless failed to provide a solid definition for the parcel as a 
whole. 
One of the primary suggestions for a consistent denominator formula was 
?????????????????????????????????????????Lucas:
The answer to this difficult [denominator] question may lie in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????en shaped by 
????????????????????????????i.e., whether and to what degree 
the relevant S??????? ???? ???? ????????? ?????? ???????????? ????
protection to the particular interest in land with respect to 
which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or 
elimination of) value.123
This elaboration, however, was subsequently critiqued as only ?dictum?124
based on ???????????????????????????????????125  In the face of this incoherence, 
the arguments before the Supreme Court in Murr presented an opportunity to 
clarify this important aspect of the regulatory takings doctrine.126
IV. THE MURR PROBLEM
????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????
regulatory takings issue, the substantial regulatory framework behind the Murr
case, and the facts that led to the case.  
121. See 444 U.S. 51, 65?66 (1979).  The anti-???????????????????????????????????????????????
statement that ????????????? ???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a taking. Id.  The test for regulatory takings requires a comparison of the value taken to the value that 
remains in the property, emphasizing the importance of determining the denominator of the fraction. 
????????????????????????? ???????? ???????????, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).  For example, there was 
no taking in Tahoe–Sierra because the Court refused to segment the value of the property based on 
time. See Tahoe?Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. ????????? ?????????????? ??????????? ??????????????????????
Similarly, in Concrete Pipe, the Court reiterated the need to focus on the whole property. See Concrete 
Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993). 
122. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????property rights as being of 
a particularly fundamental nature,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
supra note 79, at 320, 350, 360???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 320?21. 
123. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016?17 n.7 (1992); see also Bd. of Regents 
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (noting ???????????????????????????? . . are created 
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
????????????????????????????Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003?04 (1984) (noting that 
property rights are informed by rights created under state law). 
124. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946 (2017). 
125. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. ?????????????????????, 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010). 
126. See infra Section V.A. 
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A. Wisconsin Courts and Regulatory Takings  
A regulatory takings claim in Wisconsin is brought pursuant to either the 
Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution127 or the substantively similar Article 
I, Section 13 in the Wisconsin Constitution.128 ??????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
United States Supreme Court precedent.129  Specifically, there are three relevant 
????????? ????? ?????????????????????????ings jurisprudence mirrors that of the 
Supreme Court. 
First, Wisconsin law allows for a regulatory taking claim where the 
governmental regulation has the same effect as a physical appropriation.130
Second, the Penn Central factors????? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? governmental 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
?????????????131?are also central to the regulatory takings analysis under 
Wisconsin Law.132  Third, the threshold determination for when the regulation 
127. ??????? ?????? ???????? ????????? be taken for public use, without just compensation.? U.S.
CONST. amend. V. 
128. ????? ????????? ??? ??? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????? ???? ???????? ????? ?????????????
????????????WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
129. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531 (1996).  The 
procedure for bringing a takings claim is, however, unique under Wisconsin law.  First, inverse 
condemnation claims must be brought under Wisconsin Statutes section 32.10 (1983)?a statute 
providing a remedy when the government fails to follow procedure in acquiring private property?
????????????????????????????-imposed restriction depriv[ing] the owner of all, or substantially all, of 
?????????????????????????????????????E?L Enters. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶ 
37, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 112?13, 785 N.W.2d 409, 425 (2010) (The court did note, however, that use of 
the statute is not requir??? ??? ???????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????? ???????????????? ???????? ????? ???????????
?????????? ??????? ????? ?????????? ?? ??????????? ??? ?? ??????????????? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ???????? ????????
?????????????????????????????????????id. ¶ 41, by (2) a governmental entity with the authority to impose 
such a restraint. ??????????????????????????????????????????, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 86, 284 N.W.2d 887, 
893 (1979).  Thus, simple consequences of government regulatory action do not rise to the level of a 
taking. E-L Enters., 2010 WI 58, ¶ 41.  Additionally, under the second factor, the police power 
??????????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ???????? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ??????? ??????? ????????????
regulatory takings framework. Brian W. Ohm, Towards a Theory of Wisconsin Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence, 4 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 191?93 (1997). 
130. Compare E–L Enters., 2010 WI 58, ¶ 22 (A claim for a taking exists where the government 
??????? ?? ??????????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation????
(emphasis added) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)), with Lingle,
supra, at ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
equivalent????????????????????????
131. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
132. See Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 374. 
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has reached the level of a taking is extremely high under both Wisconsin and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.133
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has independently developed its own unique 
take on certain aspects of the regulatory takings doctrine.134  For example, 
Wisconsin courts have taken a distinct approach to the analysis of a property 
???????? ??????????? ??????????-backed expectations.  Under Wisconsin case 
????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ????????? ???? ???????ed right to change the essential 
natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????135  Thus, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations?even those expectations held at 
the time of the investment?cannot include the unnatural development of land; 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
??????????? ??? ??????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????????? ????? ?? ???????? ??????136
????????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????137 this 
extremely narrow formulation of investment-backed expectations severely 
limits property rights by charging the property owners with knowing that their 
133. ???? ????????? ????????? ?????? ???????????? ??????????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ????
????????? ?????? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????? ????? ??? ?????? ?????????? Id.  The 
??????????????????????????????????????????????any regulatory deprivation of value that falls short of 
???? ???????????? ???? ??????????????????? ?????? ????? ??? ?????????????? ????? ??????????relieves the 
government of the burden to pay just compensation. Id. at 380.  Additionally, it is irrelevant which 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
must be denied by the regulation. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 334 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1983).  
Note the slight variation from Lucas????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015 (1992); Gregory S. Alexander, ‘Takings’ Jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court: The Past 10 
Years, in CORNELL LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, 857, 864 (1996) (n???????????????????????????????
application of the Penn Central Standards has rarely resulted in the Court finding that a regulation is a 
??????????
134. Ohm, supra note 129, at 175?76 (1997).  Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has often 
developed standards later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Brian W. Ohm, Wisconsin Takings Law–
A Brief Historical Perspective, U. OF WIS.- MADISON DEP?T OF URBAN AND REG?L PLANNING 12?13 
(1995), https://dpla.wisc.edu/sites/dpla.wisc.edu/files/inline-
files/ohm%20wisconsin%20takings%20law%20a%20brief%20historical%20perspective%2095-
6.PDF [https://perma.cc/KPM3-9NT7] [hereinafter Wisconsin Takings Historical Perspective]. 
135. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972); see also Ohm, 
supra note 129????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????R.W. 
Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶ 32, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 517, 628 N.W.2d 781, 791 (2001). 
136. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17; see also Ohm, supra note 129, at 211. 
137. ??????????????????????????????????????????, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 85, 284 N.W.2d 887, 892 
(1979).  This narrow formulation is not limited to the public trust doctrine; but also extends to other 
types of environmental regulations. Ohm, supra note 129, at 208. 
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????? ?????????????????????????????????????-?????forcing the owners to assume 
the risk for severely limiting regulations.138
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to the denominator question.  When determining the property at issue, 
Wisconsin courts often aggregate contiguous property segments as whole 
parcels139???????? ??? ??? ???????? ???? ???????? ???????? ????-segmentation 
principle.  To justify the aggregation of parcels, Wisconsin courts have 
highlighted ???? ???????? ???????? ???????? ??? ???????? ???? ????? ????? ?????????
property or individual property rights for valuation purposes by placing 
???????????? ???????????? ????????????? ???? ????????? . . . ??? ?????????140  This 
formulation further tilts the analysis in favor of the government.  By 
aggregating contiguous lots, courts give the government increased flexibility in 
land use regulation, thereby decreasing the likelihood that a regulation limits 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????141
B. Murr’s Regulatory Background
The St. Croix River area along the Wisconsin?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????142  But nearly 
from the point of discovery by French Explorers in 1697, widespread 
exploitation of natural resources in the riverbed area have threatened the 
pristine state of this beautiful river and the surrounding woodlands.143  Over 
time, the riverbed area has changed drastically at the hands of industry: from a 
thick pine forest,144 to a fruitful farmland,145 to a recreation destination 
cherished for its natural beauty.146
In the mid-1960s, increased urbanization in the Twin Cities metropolitan 
area gave rise to contrasting visions for the future of the St. Croix River area.147
138. R.W. Docks and Slips, 2001 WI 73, ¶ 29. 
139. See Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 375?76, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532 (1996). 
140. Id. at 375?76.  
141. Id. at 374. 
142. Great Rivers Confluence Symposium 2018: Valuing 50 Years of the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act, ST. CROIX 360 (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.stcroix360.com/2018/01/great-rivers-confluence-
symposium-2018-valuing-50-years-of-the-wild-and-scenic-rivers-act/ [https://perma.cc/9D6Z-
QK7F]. 
143. See EILEEN M. MCMAHON & THEODORE J. KARAMANSKI, NORTH WOODS RIVER: THE ST.
CROIX RIVER IN UPPER MIDWEST HISTORY 21, 43?46, 56?59, 73?79, 85?120, 133?38 (2009).  
144. Id. at 73. 
145. Id. at 150?60. 
146. Id. at 211?20. 
147. Id. at 268?70. 
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On one hand, environmentalists and recreationalists sought to preserve and 
promote the natural beauty of the region.148  On the other hand, regional energy 
?????????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????? and proposed the 
construction of a coal-fired power plant and power-producing dams along the 
river.149  In the face of this conflict, Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson 
introduced federal regulations for the preservation of the St. Croix River area.150
These efforts were rewarded in 1968 when President Lyndon Johnson signed 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act into law.151  The Scenic Rivers Act, an effort to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????? ?????? ????????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ???? ???????
generations.152  The Upper St. Croix River was one of the original eight rivers 
designated for preservation under the Act.153  Protection was extended to the 
Lower St. Croix River in 1972.154
The regulatory framework impacting the St. Croix River and underlying the 
controversy in Murr is quite extensive.  To most effectively preserve the natural 
state of the St. Croix, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act emphasized collaboration 
between state and federal agencies, ?[encouraging] [s]tates and their political 
subdivisions . . . to cooperate in the planning and administration of components 
???????????????155  Wisconsin, consistent with this call for collaboration, enacted 
Wisconsin Statutes section ?????? ??? ??????????? ??e protection of the wild, 
148. Id. at 269?70. 
149. Id. at 270. 
150. Id. at 270?75. 
151. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90?542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
?? ????? ????????? ? ????? ???? ???????? ?? ????????? ??????? ???? ???? ????????????? ??? ????????? ?????????
rivers . . . which . . . possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, 
historic, ????????????????????????????????????Id. § 1(b); see also Lyndon B. Johnson and the Environment,
NAT?L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/lyjo/planyourvisit/upload/environmentcs2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NEN-SM5G].  ?????????? ???????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . . to [use] our 
????????????????????????????????????????????Id. 
152. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, ?????
1969, Book II?July 1, 1968 to Jan. 20, 1969, at 1000, 1002 (1970). 
153. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 3(a)(6). 
154. Lower Saint Croix River Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92?560, sec. 2, § 9, sec. 3, 86 Stat. 1174 
(1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1968)); see also Classification of a Small Scenic Riverway, 40 
Fed. Reg. 43,244 (Sept. 19, 1975) (????????????? ???? ???????????? ???? ???? ?????????? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for th???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????).   
155. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 10(e); Lower Saint Croix National Scenic Riverway, 41 Fed. 
Reg. 26,236?37 (June 25, 1976); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (2012). 
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scenic and recreational qualities of the river for present and future 
?????????????156 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??? ???????????? ?? ????????? ???? ??????? ?????? ?????????????157 section 
30.27(2) directed the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and 
impacted local governments to adopt zoning guidelines and standards that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????158
Pursuant to these legislative directives, the Wisconsin DNR adopted 
Wisconsin Administrative Code NR 118.159  St. Croix County eventually 
followed, adopting an ordinance in lock-?????????? ???? ???????? ?????160  The 
language contained in the identical provisions and relevant to Murr?? issue of 
non-conforming substandard lots161 ?????????????????????????????????????????????
in common ownership may only be sold or developed as separate lots if each 
of the lots has at least one acre of net project area??162  The ordinance defined 
????? ???????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ?????????????
zones, flood plains, road rights-of-????????? ?????????163  Mitigating the impact 
of these regulations, a grandfather clause exempted ?substandard? lots already 
owned at the time of the implementation of the regulations.164  These 
regulations constitute the regulatory framework at issue in Murr.
C. Factual and Procedural Background 
The Murr family has long treasured its property on a bend of the beautiful 
St. Croix River.165  The Murrs? parents purchased Lot F in 1960 and built a 
156. WIS. STAT. § 30.27(1) (2018). 
157. Classification of a Small Scenic Riverway, 40 Fed. Reg. at 43,246. 
158. WIS. STAT. § 30.27(2)(a) (2018); see also WIS. STAT. § 30.27(3) (2018) (noting that the 
State legislation required the impacted county, city, village, or town to adopt guidelines and standards 
consistent with the DNR rules).  Subsection 3 also enabled the DNR to adopt and enforce ordinances 
where the local governing body failed to do so.  Id.
159. See Joint Appendix at 7, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 13?214), 2016 
WL 1459531; see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118 (July 1980). 
160. See Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 7; see also ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4) (2005). 
161. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
162. ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, 
sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4)(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). 
163. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.03(27) (November 2004); Joint Appendix, supra note 159, 
at 26; ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, 
§ 17.09(160) (2017).  
164. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4) (February 2012); ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4)(I)(4)(a)(2) (2005).  
165. See Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 32. 
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?????? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ????????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????
company in 1961.166  In 1963, the parents also purchased Lot E?the lot at issue 
in the litigation?this time holding the lot in their own names, intending to use 
it as an investment property to be developed or sold separate from Lot F.167  The 
Murrs held the two lots separately168 until the parents transferred the properties 
in 1994 and 1995, respectively, to the joint ownership of their children.169
The two lots are very similar in layout: each has two plots of developable 
land?an upper and lower plot?divided by a steep 130-foot bluff, and each 
consists of approximately 1.25 acres in total area.170  But the combined ?????
????????????????????????????????171  Consequently, the transfer of the two lots to 
the joint ownership of the children in 1995 triggered the aforementioned merger 
provisions and the two lots effectively became one under state law.172
Around 2004, the family grew tired of repeated flooding at their communal 
summer refuge and began discussions with the St. Croix Zoning Board in 
???????? ??? ??????-??????? ?????? ??????173  To fund the necessary upgrades, the 
family planned to sell the undeveloped Lot E.174 ???????????????????????????
???????????????????? ???? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ????? ????? ???? ??
could not be sold or developed as a separate lot because the merger provisions 
had combined Lot E and Lot F.175 ???????????????????????????????????????
determination and applied for six variances and two special exception 
166. Id. at 6; Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017). 
167. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 6; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940. 
168. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 6.  Lot F was held by the family business and Lot E was 
held by the parents. See id.  Additionally, the properties were taxed separately through the end of 2012.
Id. at 24. 
169. Id. at 6; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941. 
170. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 29?30; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940; Murr v. St. Croix Cty. 
Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 4, 332 Wis. 2d 172, 176?78, 796 N.W.2d 837, 841. 
171. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (per 
curiam) (unpublished).  Lot E itself only has .5 acres of net project area. Joint Appendix, supra note 
159, at 76. 
172. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 14 (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
NR § 118.08(4)(a)(i) (February 2012)) (noting that, upon the transfer of the property, the grandfather 
cl????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????????????
properties triggered the merger under both ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND 
USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4) (2005) and WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR section 
118.08(4) (February 2012). 
173. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 76. 
174. Id.
175. Id. at 93. 
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permits.176  The Zoning Board rejected all applications, finding that they were 




After exhausting the available administrative remedies, the Murrs were left 
in a situation where Lot E was essentially rendered useless as an independent 
parcel: the property could not be sold, developed, or even used for agricultural 
purposes.179  Hoping to solve their dilemma, the Murr family brought a claim 
seeking just compensation for the unconstitutional taking of its land.180  The 
family argued that the merger provision artificially melded Lot E and Lot F 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
thus triggering an unconstitutional taking.181   
The Wisconsin courts disagreed.  The circuit court granted the 
????????????? ??????? ???? ???????? judgment, concluding that the Murrs?
property?when viewed as a whole?retained some beneficial use.182  The 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals then took up the case and provided a thorough 
analysis of the S?????????????????????????????183  Focusing on the state c???????
unique jurisprudential twist on the Penn Central parcel as a whole 
terminology,184 the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and held that the 
contiguous lots should be viewed as a whole and, when viewed as such, the 
176. Id. at 24; Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017); Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 5. 
177. See Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 15; Joint Appendix, supra
note 159, at 66. 
178. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 14.  The circuit court that 
?????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ????????? agreed with the rejection of the special exception permits 
(denial to use or sell the lots separately) but disagreed with the rejection of the variances. Id. ¶¶ 2?3.  
The Murrs appealed this decision and the court of appeals affirmed regarding the special exception 
permit. Id. ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ???? ???????? ???????? ????????? ?????????? ????
variances, thereby ?????????? ????????????????????? ??????? ?????????? Id. ¶ 3.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court denied the petition for review.  Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, cert. 
denied, 2011 WI 86, 335 Wis. 2d 146, 803 N.W.2d 849 (2011). 
179. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 9. 
180. Id. at 10; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 
(2017) (No. 15?214), 2015 WL 4932231. 
181. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 9?10. 
182. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 31 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) 
(per curiam) (unpublished). 
183. See id. ¶¶ 16?19. 
184. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130?31 (1978). 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????185  The court 
?????????????????? ????? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????186  The 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????knew 
or should have known ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
merged by law at that point.187
Following denial of review at the Wisconsin Supreme Court,188 the United 
States Supreme Court granted the Murr?????????????????????.189
V. MURR AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Arguments of the Murr Family and the State of Wisconsin 
In their petition for writ of certiorari, the Murrs argued that this case 
presented the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve its long-
??????????????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????? ???????????????
?????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ??????? ????????190  Considering 
??????????????????????????????191 the precise set of facts presented in the case,192
and the fact that state and federal law seem to conflict on this precise issue,193
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ???? ???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????194  The 
Murrs suggested that, just as the Court has refused to adopt a principle of 
segmentation,195 ???? ???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
185. Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 31??????????????????????????????? ????? property was 
???????????????????????????????????-established rule that contiguous property under common ownership 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. ¶¶ 19?20. 
186. Id. ¶ 29.  
187. Id. (emphasis added). 
188. Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 31, cert. denied, 2015 WI 47, 366 Wis. 2d 59, 862 
N.W.2d 899 (2015).  
189. Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 890 (Mem.) (2016). 
190. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 180, at 13?14. 
191. Id. at 15. 
192. Id. at 14?17. 
193. Id. at 17?21. 
194. Id. at 11?12, 15. 
195. As discussed previously, segmentation refers to the idea that individual rights within the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
See ?????????????????????????? ????????????15, Murr v. Wisconsin 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15?214), 
2016 WL 1459199. 
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contiguous properties.196 ????????????? ?????????????????????entire fee title of a 
single parcel is the parcel as a whole????? ????????? ???????? ??????197  This 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????198
The State, on the other hand, argued that state law should control the parcel 
as a whole analysis.199  The State focused its ???????????????????????????????????
in Lucas ????? ????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ??? ????????? ????????
???????????? ???????????? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ???????? law of 
???????????200 ??? ???? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ???????????
expectations shaped by that same state law when determining the relevant 
??????????201 ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
needed clarity in the regulatory takings doctrine.202
B. Murr v. Wisconsin: The Decision 
Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion
Following a summary of Murr??????????????????????????????????????????????
Kennedy noted the painfully obvious: Mahon ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????203  The Justice 
then framed the opinion by discussing th?? ???????? ??????????? ????????
jurisprudence???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ????????? ???????????204 ???? ???? ?????
196. Id. at 16?19.  Indeed, t????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????ence. Id. at 19. 
197. Id. at 23. 
198. Id. at 24?29. 
199. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin at 1, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. at 1933 (2017) 
(No. 15???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
takings analysis has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the 
content of . . ?? ???? ???????? ??? ???????? ????? ????? ????????????? ????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? Id. 
(quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)) (emphasis omitted). 
200. Id. at 2 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016??? n.7). 
201. Id. at 24. 
202. Id. at 25, 35. 
203. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017). 
204. Id. ????????? ??[Private] [p]roperty rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property 
ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where governments are 
??????????????????????????????????Id. at 1943. 




?????????????????206  Thi????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of 
the regulatory takings analysis, only hinted at the vague test the majority was 
about to produce. 
Justice Kennedy then turned to the all-important denominator question: 
?[w]hat is the proper unit of property against which to assess the effect of the 
????????????????????????????????207  Refusing to implement a clear standard208
and rejecting the arguments of both the Murr family and the State of Wisconsin 
as too formulistic,209 Justice Kennedy instead adopted a multi-factor test?
doubling down on the indeterminacy of the already problematic Penn Central
analysis.210  This test, objective in nature with reasonable expectations derived 
205. Id. at 1937 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (highlighting ???????????????s
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
could not be diminished without paying for eve???????????????????????????????????. Id. at 1943; see
also Thomas, supra note 28, at 498?99 (discussing the arguments for and against a strict regulatory 
taking doctrine). 
206. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617?18 (2001)).  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . . is to prevent the government from 
?forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.????Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617?18 (quoting Armstrong v. Unites States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
207. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938. 
208. Id. ????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Id.
209. Id. at 1946.  ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Takings Clause should be coextensive with those un???? ?????? ?????? Id. at 1944.  First, t??????????
????????????? ????? ???? ?????? ??????? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???
??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????-use regulations do not work 
???????????Id. at 1947.  Because merger provisions such as the one at issue in this case are generally a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ate lot line would frustrate the efforts of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
Id. at 1947?48.  Second?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
state law . . . simply assumes the answer to the question.??Id. at 1946. ???????????????????????????????????
authority to shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, leaving 
[property]-owners without recourse against unreasonabl?????????????????????????????????????????? . . 
????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 1944?45 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Also, 
although the Court suggested in Lucas that state law may be determinative, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
merely one factor of consideration. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946?47. 
210. See Brady, supra note 79, at 55. 
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????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
characteristics of the land; and [3] the prospective value of the regulated 
??????211 ??????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ??????able
expectations about property ownership would lead a [property owner] to 
anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as 
?????????????????212
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ?the treatment of the land 
under st???????????????????213  Although a takings claim is not invalid per se 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
factors that most landowners would reasonably consider in forming fair 
???????????????????????????????????214  Thus, in the formulation of reasonable 
expectations, property ???????????? ????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????ensation of the ??????????215
???????? ??????? ????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ????????????????? ??? ????
property.216 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ???????????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ???? ???? ????????????




regulation, with special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of 
????????????????219 ??? ????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????
?????????????220?some type of value-based complementarianism, though not 
necessarily economic in nature221?between the holdings may mitigate any 







218. Id. at 1945?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????what areas are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
219. Id. at 1946. 
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1949.  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
effect may be tempered if the regulated land adds value to the remaining property, such as by increasing 
privacy, expa?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 1946; see also 
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????????? ??????? ??? ?? ???????????? ? ???? ???????? ??? ????? ?? ?????????
relationship . . . may counsel against consideration of all the holdings as a 
???????????????222
Applying this multifactor test, the Court concluded that Lot E and F should 
be aggregated and evaluated together as the relevant parcel.223  Regarding the 
first factor, the Murrs? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and local law and created what should have been ?????????????????????????????
that the lots would be treated as a single parcel.224  Applying the second factor, 
the contiguousness of the lot lines, the natural limitations of potential uses of 
the lots, and the location of the lots along a highly protected riverway were all 
physical characteristics that supported the treatment of the lots as a unified 
parcel.225  The third factor?looking to the value of the property under the 
challenged regulations?also supported the consideration of the lots as a single 
parcel because the enhanced combined value of the lots, as opposed to their 
lower valuation when viewed indepe????????? ??????? ??????
?????????????????226  In short, due to their own actions, the unique location of 
their land, and the complimentary value of the property, the Murrs should have 
expected that their land would be significantly burdened by governmental 
regulations.227
Justice Kennedy thus affirmed the Wisconsin Court of Appeal?? decision 
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
??????228  And viewing the two lots together as a single parcel, the Murrs failed 
??????????????? ????????????????????229
Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 253?54 (observing that this third factor is a 
???????????????????????????????????????????
222. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946. 
223. Id. at 1948. 
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1948?49. 
227. Garnett, supra note 79, at 143. 
228. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949. 
229. Id.  Indeed, there was no taking under Lucas????????? ??????????????????????????????????
property ha[d] no????????????????????????????Id.  Similarly, there was no taking under the Penn Central
analysis because the economic impact of the regulations was not severe, the Murrs had no reasonable 
expectations to sell or develop the lots separately due to the regulations predating their ownership of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????able land-?????????????????Id.
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Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent230
Despite his agreement with the ultimate conclusion reached by the majority, 
Chief Justice Roberts authored a strong dissent.231  The Chief Justice argued 
????????? ???????????????????????????232 with its ????????????????233 ?????????????
????????????????234 ???????????????????????????????????????????????235 Chief Justice 
Roberts introduced exactly what Justice Kennedy and the majority said could 
??????????? ?????????? ??????236 ????????????????? ???????????? ???????ndaries of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????? ??????? ???? ???? ???? ????????? ???????????? ???????????????237  The 
?????? ???????? ????????? ????? ????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????? Penn 
Central?? ????????????????? ???????????? ??? ???????????????as the majority 
suggested?at the hands of either property owners or the government.238  State 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? be the ideal basis for determining 
the relevant parcel against which to weigh the effect of the governmental 
regulation.239
230. Justice Thomas also authored an insightful dissent, in which he suggested that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause would provide a better basis for the regulatory takings claim. See id. at 1957 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  See generally John Greil, Second-Best Originalism and Regulatory Takings,
41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL?Y 373 (2018); Jonathan H. Adler, Should Regulatory Takings Doctrine be 




231. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950.  Indeed, under the existing regulatory takings doctrine, it would 
be difficult to come to the opposite conclusion.  As Justice Kagan submitted at oral arguments, the 
????????????????????????????? S??????????the half defining lots lines?while ignoring the other half?
the presumably legitimate governmental regulation at issue in this case. Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 16, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15?214), 2017 WL 1048381. 
232. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1954. 
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
237. Id. at 1953. 
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1954.  Moreover, this approach would be the only logical one considering the relevant 
parcel in the regulatory takings analysis has always been identified pursuant to principles of state 
property law. Garnett, supra note 79, at 133, 139.  But the majority knocks this stable definition of 
??????????????????????????????????? . . . ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the identification of the relevant parcel a takings-????????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ??? ????
??easonableness of the regulation???Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955?57 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Additionally, the Chief Justice noted that the ?????????????????????????????
the effectiveness of the Takings Clause as a check on th??????????????????????
to infringe upon personal property rights.240 ???????????????????????????????
the baseline of state property law principles allows the government to argue for, 
??????????? ????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????gives 
?????? ??????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??????????? ??????????241  Under this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????242
Indeed, the property owne?? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????????
regulations are unreasonable when simply seeking to identify the relevant 
parcel for the takings analysis.243  Thus, in the clash between the government?
????????????? ???? ???????? ??????and the interests of individual property 
owners, the already inherent imbalance against the property owner is only 
??????????????????-counting to tip the scales in favor of the gove????????244
VI. RESPONSE TO THE DECISION 
A. Academic Reaction to the Decision 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to clean up this important aspect of the regulatory takings doctrine245 and the 
??????????? ????????????? ????? impact on personal property rights.246  Justice 
????????? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ????? ????????????? ???????????? ??????????? ??
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
parcel?for the first time defining property under the Takings Clause as a 
240. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).




245. See generally Brady, supra note 79; Epstein, supra note 101, at 151?52; Garnett, supra note 
79; Green, supra note 76; Charles M. Kassir, Note, Murr-ky Waters: How Murr v. Wisconsin Creates 
Uncertainty in Attempting to Answer the “Denominator Question??????MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 73 
(2018). 
246. See Ilya Somin, A Loss for Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin, WASH. POST (June 23, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/a-loss-for-
property-rights-in-murr-v-wisconsin/?utm_term=.9e252c35d65d [https://perma.cc/33XH-S7P2]; see 
also Roger Pilon, Another Bleak Supreme Court Decision for Property Rights, WASH. EXAMINER
(June 28, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/another-bleak-supreme-court-decision-for-
property-rights/article/2627245 [https://perma.cc/7RW5-H3JH].  Indeed, Murr ????????? ???????????
???? ???????? ?????????? ??????????????? ??????? ???????? ??? ????????? ??????? ???????? ??????????? ?????????
Garnett, supra note 79, at 131. 
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matter of federal common-law.247  This unfortunate development fails to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??????? ??? ad hocery?? ????? ??? ???????? ???-defined framework.248
Furthermore, the doubling down on factor tests only compounds the Penn 
Central ?????????????????????????Penn Central ?????????249  It would have been 
???? ??????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ????? ?????? ???????????
expectations as to the denominator of the regulatory-?????????????????250
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??? ???????? ???????? ???????? ? ??? ???? ???????? ???? ????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????251  Yet 
somew???? ???????????????????? ????????????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ????? ????
more an individual property owner knows?or should know?about the 
????????????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????????? ??? ?? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????
insulated they become from a successful takings claim.252  The obvious danger 
of this approach is in its flexibility: the government and the courts can twist 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????arallel in 
another jurisdiction.253  Thus, perhaps the greatest question following Murr is 
whether courts will allow such manipulation or will rather give proper weight 
to the reasonableness of the property ?????????????????????254
247. Epstein, supra note 101, at 175; see also Garnett, supra note 79, at 141?42; Brady, supra 
note 79, at 55?56.  The holding in Murr also poses a severe risk to property federalism. Id.  This is 
???????? ????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????? ?????????????? ??? ???? ??????
?????????????akings Clause. See Karkkainen, supra note 58, at 831. 
248. Epstein, supra note 101, at 175, 178. 
249. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 231, at 35 (statement of Wisconsin Solicitor 
General Misha Tseytlin); see also Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 259; Brady, 
supra note 79, at 54?55. 
250. Epstein, supra note 101, at 178. 
251. Sara K. Beachy, Regulatory Takings: U.S. Supreme Court Announces New Test in 
Wisconsin Case, INSIDE TRACK (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=9&Issue=13&Ar
ticleID=25710 [https://perma.cc/S7RT-R8XT]. 
252. Epstein, supra note 101, at 180.  Notice, for example, that in the analysis of Murr, Justice 
Kennedy failed to consider actual expressed expectations of the Murrs, instead focusing on what the 
Murrs should have expected. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017). 
253. Garnett, supra note 79, at 146?48; see also Luke A. Wake, The Enduring (Muted) Legacy 
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Quarter Century Retrospective 25 (April 28, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2960341 
[https://perma.cc/B5F2-YCQA]. 
254. See Wake, supra note 253 (manuscript at 25).  Also concerning for individual property 
??????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????? ????????? ??? ???????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????
power. Epstein, supra note 101, at 179.  Indeed, the Court only briefly noted that the land use regulation 
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??? ?????????? ??????????????? decision only further muddles the regulatory 
takings doctrine in lower court systems across the nation.  The shift away from 
the straightforward baseline of constitutional property federalism presents 
lower courts?especially at the state level?with a much more complex 
analysis.255 Murr?? factor-driven approach to determining the objective 
reasonableness of the regulatory action will likely lead?although certainly not 
require256?courts to consider analogous regulatory frameworks employed by 
other jurisdictions.257 ????? ?????????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??????-state 
??????would undoubtedly lead to inconsistent application by courts at every 
level and further tilt the scales against individual property owners. 258
B. Wisconsin Law in the Wake of Murr
1.????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????
Legislature.259  Even before the final decision in Murr, Wisconsin lawmakers 
h??? ?????? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ??? ???????????? ????????????
was legitimate, primarily focusing the discussion on ????????????????????????????????????????????????
relates to the reasonableness of the property ??????????????????????Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.  This 
approach, signals the further erosion of any perceived restrictions on the police power within the 
context of regulatory takings doctrine. See discussion supra note 115. 
255. See Brady, supra note 79, at 55?56; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of 
Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 92?101 (2005) (describing the value of state competition 
in property forms); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cr?????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ???????????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment 
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310 (19???? ??????? ??? ??
commonplace of Our Federalism that [rules of property] are left for definition by bodies of state law 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The Federalist Dimension 
of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 217?18, 222?24 (2004) (noting scholarly 
inattention to this aspect of takings law and overviewing how states differently define constitutional 
property). 
256. As noted in Section VI.B.2, it does not appear that courts are bound to consider regulations 
of other jurisdiction when conducting this part of the analysis.  Therefore, focusing on the laws within 
the relevant jurisdiction would be a better baseline against which to determine whether the property 
???????????????????????????????????????????
257. See Brady, supra note 79, at 66?68. 
258. See id. at 68?69. 
259. See Mike Longaecker, Top 10: Murrs ‘Will Remember this Year for the Rest of Our Lives’,
HUDSON STAR OBSERVER (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.hudsonstarobserver.com/news/crime-and-
courts/4379288-top-10-murrs-will-remember-year-rest-our-lives [https://perma.cc/KZJ8-GMMA]. 
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???????????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ??????? ???? ???????????????260  This 
proposed legislation included property rights reforms focused precisely on the 
types of regulations at issue in Murr.261  The embattled Murr family became the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ????????????????262
The Act makes several significant changes to ????????????????????????????
the regulatory power of local government zoning boards.263  For example, the 
Act requires local governments to grant conditional use permits?like those 
sought by the Murrs at the outset of their legal battle264?so long as the 
applic???? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ??? ???? ????????????? ???? ???????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????265  Furthermore, those imposed 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be based on substantial eviden????266  As an added protection, the applicant 
may, following the required showings of the respective parties, directly appeal 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????267
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????additional protections for 
homeowners seeking to build on, or convey the ownership rights to, 
substandard lots.268  Under the Act, no local government may prohibit a 
????????? ?????? ????? ???? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conditions or requirements have been met.269  Additionally, the Act preempts 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
260. Press Release, Wisconsin Legislature, Tiffany and Ja??????????? ???????????????? ???????
Rights? 1 (June 8, 2016), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/12/tiffany/media/1351/2016-06-08-
homeowner-bill-of-rights-pr-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBW4-ZNJR]. 
261. Id. at 1?2.  Points 4, 5, and 9 of the memorandum all focused precisely on the types of 
regulations that led to the takings claim in Murr. Id.; see also Groen, supra note 2. 
262. Longaecker, supra note 259. See generally 2017 Wis. Act 67. 
263. Those aspects not relevant to the issue at hand and, therefore, not further discussed in this 
???????? ???? ???? ?? ?????????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????
nonconforming structures, (2) a limited change to the treatment of variances, and (3) a prohibition on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
members to fly the United States flag. See HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 2?4; 2017 Wis. Act 
67. 
264. See Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 8. 
265. WIS. STAT. §§ 59.69(5e)(b), 60.61(4e)(b), 60.62(4e)(b), 62.23(7)(de)(2)(a) (2018). 
266. WIS. STAT. § 60.61(4e)(b)(1) (2018). 
267. HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 2; see also WIS. STAT. §§ 59.69(5e)(e), 60.61(4e)(e), 
60.62(4e)(e), 62.23(7)(de)(5) (2018). 
268. HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 3. 
269. WIS. STAT. § 66.10015(2)(e) (2018). 
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????????????????????????????270  Thus, pursuant to these changes, the Murrs are 
now free to either sell or develop lot E as they see fit.  More broadly, these 
provisions provide robust protections to property owners across the state and 
will serve as substantial barriers to the enforcement of unauthorized local 
regulations.271
2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court and the New Murr Standard  
At least from a jurisprudential perspective, the Wisconsin courts seem to 
have gotten Murr right.  Not only was the state court of appeals? decision 
affirmed, but the Supreme Court also adopted a comprehensive, multi-factor 
test like that employed by the Wisconsin courts.272  Nevertheless, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court must now reconsider its regulatory takings analysis?especially 
that pertaining to the denominator factor?following Murr.  This section 
analyzes two possible approaches: (1) creating a clearer definition of the 
denominator under Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution; or (2) 
narrowly construing Murr??? ??????? ????? ??? ???????? ???????? deterioration of 
personal property rights. 
270. WIS. STAT. § 227.10(2p) (2018). 
271. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????????????????
Rights should consider the continued success of similar legislation passed following Kelo v. City of 
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court decimated the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 484, 489?90. (In Kelo, the court held that the 
transfer of property from one private property ?????? ??? ?? ???????? ???????? ??????? ???? ??????????
????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????including Wisconsin?
???????????? ?????? ???? ???????? ??? ?? ????????????? ????? ??? ???????? ????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????
decision. See HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 3?4; see also Nick Sibilla, Landowner’s Bill of 
Rights Are Not “Suggested Guidelines,” Georgia Supreme Court Rules, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/11/03/landowners-bill-of-rights-are-not-
suggested-guidelines-georgia-supreme-court-rules/#192bfd481ebe [https://perma.cc/GE3V-Q5QL].  
Considering the success of the acts in other states, Wisconsin residents should rest assured that their 
property rights have been effectively bolstered and will be upheld by courts should a political 
subdivision impose upon these newly established rights.  For example, in City of Marietta v. 
Summerour, 807 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2017), t??? ??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
bill of rights passed in the wake of Kelo ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?ocal 
ordinances, id. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????,? id. at 331. 
272. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945?46 (2017); see also discussion supra pp. 27?
28 (discussing Murr at the court of appeals).  Notably, Wisconsin courts have historically been a leader 
in the area of regulatory takings law. See Ohm, supra note 129, at 175?76.  For example, seven years 
prior to the regulatory takings revolution in Mahon, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that it was 
??????? ????? ????????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ???? ????????????? ????? so far as to violate some 
guaranteed right???Mehlos v. City of Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 601, 146 N.W. 882, 885 (1914) 
(emphasis added); see also Wisconsin Takings Historical Perspective, supra note 134, at 12. 
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a. New Federalism: Independent Interpretation of the Takings Clause 
Under the Wisconsin Constitution 
“[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their 
citizens the full protections of the federal constitution.  State 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their 
protections often extending beyond those required by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.  The legal 
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not 
be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state 
law—for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot 
be guaranteed.”
— Justice William J. Brennan273
Through the incorporation of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, 
federal constitutional claims have inundated state courts,274 thrusting them to 
the front lines of federal constitutional interpretation.275  As a result, litigators 
and judges alike began to focus solely on federal constitutional claims in state 
courts and failed to analyze or even raise separate arguments under parallel state 
constitutional provisions.276  The majority of states have even adopted a 
lockstep approach?or something very near it?to the interpretation of parallel 
state and federal constitutional provisions.277  This development has 
?????????????? ?????????? ???? ???????????? ??? ?????? ??????????????? ????? ????
individual rights under state constitutions have begun to lose their 
significance.278
The abandonment of protections under state constitutions has led some 
legal theorists, judges, and even state courts to embrace New Federalism?the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
273. Brennan, supra note 58, at 491. 
274. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State 
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1147?????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???????? ???????? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ????????????al issues in state 
??????????????????
275. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 492.  Again, it is generally accepted that the Takings Clause 
was incorporated and made applicable to the states through Chicago B. & Q.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226 (1897).  
276. See SUTTON, supra note 44, at 8?9; see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional 
Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 345 (2004) 
[hereinafter State Constitutional Law]. 
277. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002). 
278. See State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 345. 
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dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions 
??????????????279  In sho?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutional provisions however they wish,?280 ??????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ????????
proceeding in lockstep with Supreme Court jurisprudence.281  New 
F??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????282
They submit that New Federalism is logical considering that federal 
constitutional guarantees of individual rights originated in the states.283
Furthermore, new federalism provides state courts the opportunity to have the 
final say on matters because decisions grounded solely on state constitutional 
provisions are unreviewable by the Supreme Court.284
Though traditionally employing a lockstep approach to the interpretation of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Bill of Rights, the Wisconsin Supreme Court fully embraced New Federalism 
279. Brennan, supra note 58, at 502; see also SUTTON, supra note 44, at 9.  Proponents of New 
F??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 347.  Theoretically, New Federalism provides 
valuable benefits to the constitutional system of dual federalism.  The fact that (1) state courts may be 
freer in developing new rules and doctrines and (2) the Supreme Court would benefit from the judicial 
experimentation of various state courts when developing its own rules are just two of several reasons 
to seriously consider this approach. See SUTTON, supra note 44, at 17?18, 20.  Even so, the 
????????????????????????New Federalism is the determination of which questions are important for 
??????????? ??? ?????????? ???uniform ????????? ???????? ????????????????? ???? ?????? ??????????????State 
Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 348. 
280. SUTTON, supra note 44, at 16; Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 
TEX. L. REV. ????????? ??????? ???????????????? ?????? ?????? ???????????????????????????????? ????? ???
interpreting their own constitutions, state courts legitimately may diverge from the authoritative 
interpretations of analogous provisions in the federal constitution????
281. State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 345.  Under New Federalism, the constitutional 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
lockstep approach without independently weighing the protections provided by their own state 
constitution. Brennan, supra note 58, at 502.  Thus, pursuant to New Federalism, state courts should 
only follow federal court decisions to the extent they are logical and well-reasoned. Id.
282. Brennan, supra note 58, at 503 (noting that f??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????).
283. See SUTTON, supra note 44, at 8. 
284. See Michigan v. Long?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
300 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:261 
in the early 2000s.285  For example, in State v. Knapp,286 the court abandoned 
???????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ???? ????????
protections in favor of more expansive protections under the S????????????????
constitutional provision.287  Similarly, in State v. Dubose,288 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court struck its own path?for the first time unmoored by parallel 
Supreme Court jurisprudence?on the issue of eyewitness identification 
evidence.289
T????? ???? ????????? ???? ???? ???????? ???????? ??? New Federalism were 
????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???????
unvarnished result-?????????????290  For one, United States Court of Appeals 
Judge Diane Sykes?a former Justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court?
argued that the Wisconsin Su?????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ???? independent 
??????????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rather than a principled analysis and interpretation of th?????????????????????????
provision.291  Truly, though there are several concerns with the doctrine,292 the 
greatest might be that New F?????????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ?????
??????????????????????293 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????294  Such an aggressive 
285. Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 733 
(2006).  See also State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 348 (?????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????).  This change was likely stimulated 
by then-Chief Justi???????????????????????????????????????. See generally, Abrahamson, supra note 
274; State Constitutional Law, supra note 276. 
286. 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. 
287. See Rick Esenberg, A Court Unbound?  The Recent Jurisprudence of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court 9?10 (2007), https://fedsoc-cms-
public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/IhZ6cE38iAto3CRWgllVqKrbM9j2IkM6y7zNZE56.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RXG9-KHUW] [hereinafter Esenberg White Paper]; see also Sykes, supra note 285, 
at 731?34. 
288. 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. 
289. See Sykes, supra note 285, at 734. 
290. Id. at 733. 
291. Id.
292. For example, in addition to the aforementioned concerns with judicial activism, New 
Federalism also (1) restricts the flexibility of state government and (2) leads to unpredictable results. 
See Maltz, supra note 280, at 1002. 
293. Esenberg White Paper, supra note 287, at 10. 
294. Richard A. Epstein, The Double-Edged Sword of State Constitutional Law, 9 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 723, 743 (2015) [hereinafter Double-Edged Sword].  Thus, just as Progressives on the 
Supreme Cour????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????-legislative position in state courts. Richard A. Epstein, 
The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough?, 58 STAN. L.
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approach to judging should be avoided lest state courts?like the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court following Knapp and Dubose?be justifiably labeled as 
???????????a disturbing characterization for any court.295  While the Wisconsin 
?????????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ????????????????? ?????????
merely for the sake of uniformity,296 it should have some principled basis on 
which to justify a departure from Supreme Court analysis of parallel 
constitutional provisions.297
In the context of the Takings Clause, there appears to be no such basis for 
a divergent approach under the Wisconsin Constitution.  Takings Clause 
provisions under the Wisconsin and federal constitutions are substantively 
nearly identical.298  While, under New Federalism, similarities in both text and 
structure do not necessarily require consistent interpretations,299 a differing 
approach?even if to further bolster personal property rights?would 
REV. 1793, 1795 (2006).  Those who initially championed New Federalism were not so concerned 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is to expand constituti???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See Brennan, supra
note 58, at 503.  Thus, this approach, without considering history or context or history of the 
constitutional provisions at issue, is merely results-orientation that is unbecoming of the role of the 
judiciary. See Sykes, supra note 285, at 733; see also Michael B. Brennan, Are Courts Becoming too 
Activist: Wisconsin’s Supreme Court has Shown a Worrisome Turn in That Direction, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 2005, at J2 [hereinafter Michael B. Brennan]. 
295. See Michael B. Brennan, supra note 294; see also, Esenberg White Paper, supra note 287, 
at 10; Sykes, supra note 285, at 737?38. 
296. Indeed, courts that do take this approach must do so thoughtfully and with much care. See
Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case 
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1503?04, 1530?31 (2005). 
297. Judge Sykes contrasted the dangerous and aggressive approach to judging presented by 
New Federalism with the principled approach of judicial restraint: 
[Under New Federalism,] longstanding legal standards are rewritten or simply 
disregarded at will, either by reference to less authoritative decisional resources?
such as disputed social science research?or simply the c??????????????????????
policy judgment and raw power to render a binding statewide decision.  Judges 
who are sensitive to some limits on the scope of judicial authority and competence 
generally try to confine themselves to authoritative and objective sources of 
interpretation????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ????????and are 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  Among other things, 
this approach has the virtue of constraining the judges to behave like judges rather 
than legislators. 
Sykes, supra note 285, at 737; see also Michael B. Brennan, supra note 294 (noting that the practice 
of judicial restraint is the opposite of judicial activism). 
298. Compare Amendment V in the U.S. Constitution ????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ?????????????????????????????with article I, section 13 in the Wisconsin Constitution ??????
property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor????
299. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 500; see also SUTTON, supra note 44, at 16. 
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undoubtedly open the court to damaging charges of judicial activism.300  Thus, 
absent some distinguishing language, context, or ascertainable intent, 
Wisconsin courts should primarily look to the analysis of the Supreme Court 
for guidance on the regulatory takings doctrine. 
b. Narrow Interpretation and Application of Murr’s Multi-Factor Test 
“[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and 
property should be liberally construed.  A close and literal 
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to 
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in 
sound than in substance.  It is the duty of courts to be watchful 
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon.”
— Justice Joseph P. Bradley301
The second, more judicially conservative approach302?nonetheless 
capable of protecting individual property rights?would be to follow but 
narrowly construe Murr??? ?????-f?????? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????303
Although the majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to address the 
denominator question in its first Takings Clause decision following Murr?
Adams Outdoor Advertising v. Madison304?it will almost certainly soon have 
300. ??????????????????????????????????less and until we know how state courts will exercise 
their new ?????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????? ????????????????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ????
institution. Double-Edged Sword, supra note 294, at 725.  Also, New Federalism appears to serve as a 
???????-?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????? ???????? federal government and big 
government. Id. at 743; see also State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 348?49 (The tide seems 
to turn based on the rights at stake); Michael B. Brennan, supra note 294 (??????????????????????????
direction can turn activist in the opposite way.  Unmoored from its constitutionally defined role, the 
court floats with the political tide. . . . [E]veryone is against judicial activism, but only as he or she 
???????????????Id. Criticism of judicial activism can just as easily be leveled by either side where a court 
steps outside the bounds of its role. 
301. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
302. Judicially conservative not in the political sense, but only in the sense that such an approach 
adheres to the traditional bounds of judicial restraint rather than judicial activism.  See Brennan, supra
note 294. 
303. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. 
304. 2018 WI 70 (2018).  At issue in Adams Outdoor Advert. L.P. v. City of Madison was 
??????????????s property was taken when the City of Madison constructed a pedestrian bridge that 
blocked visibility from the highway of one site of the billboard. Id. ¶ 2.  The majority held that ?a right 
to visibility of private property from a public road is not a cognizable right giving rise to a protected 
????????? ??????????? Id. ¶ 5.  Summarily ??????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????????????
protected, the majority failed to even cite Murr in its discussion of the relevant parcel. Id. ¶ 44.  But 
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another chance to do so.  Indeed, the Adams Outdoor ???????????????????????????
cite Murr leaves a blank slate on which the court can yet develop its iteration 
of the Murr test.  Moving forward, there are two dangerous pitfalls that 
Wisconsin courts must avoid as they sort out this issue.   
First, Wisconsin courts must not give too much weight to Murr??? ??????
factor?the treatment of the land under state and local law.  The Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals in Murr v. State ?????????????????????????????????????????????
land under state law, noting that the contiguousness of the lots and their merger 
under state law was a near-determinative factor that led to their aggregation for 
purposes of the takings analysis.305  But the analysis under Murr is much more 
????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????????????
of the land under state law, there is no single factor that should dominate the 
analysis.306  Rather than continuing to rely so heavily on the treatment of the 
land under state law, Wisconsin courts should carefully weigh this 
consideration together with the other two factors under the new analysis.   
Furthermore, the scope of the analysis under this first factor should be 
????????? ?????????? ????? ???????????? ???? ????????????????? ??? ??????????
property owners? expectations.  Measuring these expectations based on laws or 
regulations on comparable property in other regions or states would place too 
high a burden on homeowners as they develop their own expectations.307  This 
over-inclusive approach would further tilt the playing field against property 
owners, nearly guaranteeing that some analogous regulation can be found for 
each regulatory overreach at issue in a takings claim.308  Rather, when 
the dissent took a different view of the property right at issue, noting that the precise property right at 
issue was the permit for the single side of the billboard no longer visible from the road rather than a 
???????????????????????Id. ¶ 47 (Bradley, Rebecca J., dissenting).  The dissent came to this conclusion 
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See id. ¶ 24 n.8. 
 Recognizing the importance of the denominator factor, id. ¶ 55, the dissent proceeded to conduct 
a thorough analysis of Murr??? ????-factor analysis to identify the precise parcel at issue, id. ¶¶ 59?66.  
The dissent carefully analyzed each Murr factor ??????????????? ????? ?????????????????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????the billboard as the relevant parcel for the purposes of the 
analysis. Id.  The dissent then completed the Takings Clause analysis by concluding that the bridge 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????id. ¶ 74, and therefore constituted 
in an unconstitutional taking for which the plaintiffs were due just compensation. Id. ¶ 75. 
 Thus, although the disagreement in Adams focused on the issue for forfeiture, id. ¶ 24 n.8, ¶ 75 n.6 
(Bradley, Rebecca J., dissenting), the dissent laid a solid analytical foundation for future Takings 
Clause analyses at the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
305. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶¶ 19?20 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 
2014) (per curiam) (unpublished). 
306. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017). 
307. See Brady, supra note 79, at 66?68. 
308. Id.
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considering the reasonableness of the property ???????? ??????????????
Wisconsin courts should consider only laws that currently exist within the State 
or the relevant region.  This limited approach will ensure that property owners 
will have?or at least, are more likely to have?sufficient notice when 
developing their reasonable investment-backed expectations.  
The second pitfall Wisconsin courts must navigate is the final Murr factor: 
b????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ???????????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????309  This particularly 
malleable factor may be easily manipulated by individual parties seeking to 
persuasively frame the property at issue.  For example, regulators may cast this 
??????? ??? ?? ????-??????????????????? ???????? ????? ???????????????? some value-
based complementarianism is sufficient for the court to consider the property 
??????????????????????????????310  This approach could open the balancing test 
to governmental abuse and lead to the neglect of the other factors where the 
court detects any ???????????????????????????????-based complementarianism is 
found.311
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
regulatory takings law.  Specifically, two Wisconsin cases?Just v. Marinette 
County312 and Piper v. Ekern313?strengthen this argument in the context of 
environmental regulations.  In Just, the court held that private property owners 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????314  Additionally, in Piper,
the court held: 
[W]hile . . . a material diminution in value may result, 
nevertheless a reciprocal advantage accrues which in many 
instances it is impossible to estimate from a financial 
standpoint, but which nevertheless constitutes a thing of value 
and a compensating factor for the interference by the public 
309. Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 254, 256 (quoting Murr, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1946). 
310. Id. at 254. 
311. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946, 1949. 
312. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
313. 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923). 
314. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17.  The court reasoned that the takings analysis undergoes a shift where 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????[w]hile loss of value is to be considered 
in determining whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing the character 
of the land at the expense of harm t????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 22?
23. 
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with property rights.315
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
owners have no right to make unnatural alterations to their property,316 (2) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????317 and 
(3) as previously discussed, property owners are only due just compensation 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????318
Applying these principles in a situation similar to Murr, the government 
could argue that the mere aesthetic enhancement of leaving a merged parcel 
undeveloped?otherwise rendered useless to the owner?is enough of a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????.  So long as the properties have 
some value-??????? ????????? ??????????????? ????? ??????????? ????????????? ??????
arguably be construed as complimentary under the third Murr factor.319  Under 
this formulation, it would be hard to see any regulation rising to the level of a 
taking.  
On the other end of the spectrum, property owners may seek to manipulate 
the third Murr factor by arguing that economic complementarianism is 
necessary for the other holdings to be considered part of the parcel as a 
whole.320  This second approach, likely focusing ??? ???????? ??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . may counsel against 
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????321 will seek to make the 
lack of a value-based complementarianism outcome determinative rather than 
simply a part of the more comprehensive analysis suggested by the Court.322
315. Piper, 180 Wis. at 591.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even purely aesthetic 
considerations were a sufficient justification for the exercise of zoning powers because the limitations 
were mutually beneficial. See State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 
270, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955); see also Wisconsin Takings Historical Perspective, supra note 134, 
at 9. 
316. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17. 
317. Piper, 180 Wis. at 591. 
318. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531 (1996); see also 
Zealy discussion supra Section IV.A.  
319. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946, 1949 (2017).  Indeed, in Murr, the Court gave 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 1946.  These examples, 
unfortunately, only confirm the risk presented in this hypothetical, focusing on intangible benefits 
?????? ?? . . . increasing privacy, expanding recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural 
?????????Id.  These benefits?subjective in nature and easily manipulatable?place the protection of 
private property rights wholly in the hands of the court. 
320. Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 262. 
321. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946. 
322. Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 254, 260?62. 
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??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
parcel as a whole be determined by a variety of factors.  Therefore, when 
considering the third Murr factor, Wisconsin courts should look for some direct 
impact or interplay between the parcels at issue.  The adoption of this narrower 
approach would force the government to prove more than a tenuous relationship 
between the parties, thus protecting individual property owners?as much as is 
possible under Murr?? test?against capricious aggregation determinations by 
the courts.323  Property owners could then better predict and formulate 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, ensuring that the scales in the 
regulatory takings analysis are not insurmountably stacked against them.  This 
approach would also protect against manipulation at the hands of landowners. 
??????????????????????????????????????Murr certainly does not bode well 
for individual property owners, state courts such as those in Wisconsin can 
minimize Murr??? ??????? ???????? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ??? ???? ?????-factor 
denominator analysis.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The story of Murr is one of perseverance.  The Murrs, just a regular family 
with a recreational cabin in northern Wisconsin, were told they could not sell 
their vacant lot to fund necessary renovations to their property.324  The Murrs 
fought these regulations all the way to the Supreme Court only to lose?
witnessing the further decimation of personal property protections at their 
expense.325  Nevertheless, this was not the end of their story.  State legislators 
responded to the Murr ???????????????????????? ????????? ???????????Bill of 
Rights,326 giving the Murrs the right?after a more than fifteen-year legal 
fight?to dispose of their property as they see fit.327
The legal lesson from Murr is that states are in a unique position of 
influence when it comes to the protection of personal property rights.  Although 
the regulatory takings doctrine has largely developed at the federal level, 
personal property rights?the rights at stake in a regulatory takings analysis?
323. As previously noted in this section, giving too much weight to the existence of any value-
based complementarianism would invariably lead to the aggregation of parcels that exhibit even the 
most attenuated relationship?economic or otherwise. 
324. See Groen, supra note 2. 
325. Id.
326. See Bruce Vielmetti, Wisconsin Cabin Owners Who Lost at U.S. Supreme Court Win in the 




2018] MURR AND WISCONSIN 307 
have traditionally been defined pursuant to state law.328  Thus, as Wiscons?????
was here, state legislatures should be proactive about engaging the continuing 
deterioration of constitutional property rights.  Furthermore, state courts should 
narrowly construe the Murr?? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ????
????????????? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ??????????
state legislatures and courts must not ignore this responsibility.329
????????????????????????????? Bill of Rights has provided a template 
both for other states and for continued property rights protection within the 
State, Wisconsin courts have yet to establish their analysis of the denominator 
issue following Murr.  As discussed, Wisconsin courts should not take an 
activist approach and develop an independent Takings Clause analysis pursuant 
to the Wisconsin Constitution absent some principled basis for that deviation.
Rather, they should faithfully yet ????????????????????????????????????????????
Murr to ensure that the government does not become insulated from takings 




328. See discussion supra note 239. 
329. Burnett, supra note 3.
330. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017). 
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